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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
John Allison Huckabay appeals from

his

judgment of conviction

for felony unlawﬁll

possession of a moose.

Statement

Of The

The

facts

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

adduced

at trial are as follows:

0n October

2014, William (who goes by

2,

“David”) and Beverlee (Who goes by “Lee”) Butts were in their cabin near Mica Bay when they
heard a gunshot.

(TL, p.189,1 L.16

They drove up Red Hog Drive

—

p.190, L.3; p.193, Ls.3-6;

t0 investigate

GJ TL,

and discovered a man,

p.17, L.15

later

—

p.18,

L3.)

identiﬁed as John

Huckabay, “walking in front 0f a pickup truck.” (TL, p.193, L.10 — p.194, L.23.) Another man,

Who
L.4.)

the

introduced himself as “Bob,” was inside the truck.

The pickup truck had a “metal kind of frame” attached

bed

that

rope around

16; p.203,

looked

its

like a derrick 0r a hoist

p.194, Ls.3-7; p.198, L.25
“at the

— p.199,

back”—“something

built in

of comes kind,” and there was a cow moose “With a

neck hauled up about halfway into the truck.”

(Id.,

p.193, Ls.12-17; p.195, Ls.2-

L.24 — p.204, L3.)

Huckabay introduced
lived

(Id.,

on the other

side of

himself.

Mica Ba

”g

(1d,,

p.194, Ls.17-23.)

that “he

had been asked

He
to

told

come

David and Lee
kill

that “he

the moose”; and that

he needed David t0 back up his truck “because they were having trouble getting the moose up
into the truck.”

(1d,,

Huckabay afﬁrmed

1

p.204, Ls.16-21.)

that

he

if

Huckabay had a

did. (Id., p.199, Ls.5-8; p.214, L.8

Citations t0 the bulk transcript

pages themselves).

David asked

volume

refer t0 pages

—

p.216, L.1.)

tag for the moose;

Thereafter,

David

of the electronic ﬁle (not the transcript

and Lee, “concerned they

may have

witnessed a Violation,” “went to the Fish

department” t0 report what they had seen.

(Id.,

p.207, Ls.5-1

After talking t0 David and Lee, Fish

Grifﬁn—who gave them
Ls.4-6.)

moose

in the

Fish

helped

“additional information about the incident.”

at

— p.242,

L.7.)

(Id.,

(TL, p.190, Ls.4-6; p.243,

p.262, Ls.17-21.)

Grifﬁn also

9:45” that morning, “Mr. Grifﬁn called Mr. Huckabay t0 say there was

neighborhood Where Mr. Grifﬁn lived.”

& Game ofﬁcers met with Huckabay.

move the moose

p.241, L.21

ofﬁcers contacted a neighbor—John

Grifﬁn told ofﬁcers that he “was not a hunter.”

informed ofﬁcers “that
a

& Game

1;

& Game

for

He

(Id.,

p.327, Ls.8—17; p.331, Ls. 12-15.)

told them,

among

other things, that he had

someone:

Ofﬁcer: So What’s goin’ 0n With the moose?
got a call from John Grifﬁn that says “The thing’s hanging around up
Road.”
And, Iwas working. Iplaced a call. The guy that I called said,
by Red Hog
“No, I can’t d0 it right now. But I’m gonna call somebody else.” And about an

Huckabay:

I

“The moose ran away from us. It’s in somebody’s
front yard. Can you come help us get it out?” And so I borrowed a truck, because
my truck was up 0n blocks at that point. And went up there, helped the guys pick

hour

it

later I got a call that said

up.

And

I

said

“What d0 you want

purple Dodge, went
into their purple

(State’s EX.

5,

down to

Dodge.

00:45-01:15.)

.

to

d0 with

it?”

And

they got some 01d beat up

the launch, [unintelligible] out 0f the borrowed truck

..

Huckabay

belonged t0 “a guy named Bob Cushman.”

stated the truck they

(Id.,

used to transport the moose

01 140-01 :42; T11, p.289, Ls.4-6; p.329, Ls.2-23.)

Ofﬁcers went to Cushman’s house and noticed a “teal-colored pickup With a very
distinctive animal hoist

L.1

1.)

mounted

in the

back 0f

Cushman, Who the ofﬁcer knew from

“he didn’t

know

it”

parked out

prior “butchery and

front.

(TL, p.247, L.5

—

p.248,

meat purchasing” dealings, said

anything about a moose,” but said ofﬁcers could look in his walk-in cooler.

(Id.,

p.249, Ls.1-20.) Inside the cooler, ofﬁcers discovered a skinned and quartered carcass; a tell-tale

“hump on

[the]

p.249, L.21

An
cow moose

back,” in addition t0 some obvious

— p.251, L8;

p.252, Ls.2-1

hair, revealed

in 2014,

and afﬁrmed

— p.240,

it

that there

Cushman

was no “cow moose hunt open 0n October

2014,

L.4; p.241, Ls.14-20.)

kill

a

cow moose by

shooting said

moose

its

Huckabay moved

among

t0 dismiss the indictment for lack

other things, that a single

1401(c)(3), because “[t]he plain and

moose was

Huckabay

among

it

that

Huckabay

Without a tag.” (R.,

of jurisdiction

(id.,

pp.125-43),

insufﬁcient t0 satisfy Section 36-

unambiguous language 0f the

‘combination’ of animals in order to reach a felony charge”

ﬁnding

in a closed season and/or did

unlawfully possess said moose by gutting, quartering and/or transporting

alleging,

2,

grand jury indictedz Huckabay for felony unlawﬁll killing 0r possession of a moose,

“did unlawfully

alleging,

(Id.,

“[drew] for a tag” t0 hunt

under Idaho Code Sections 36-1404(c)(3) and 36-1404(a)(2), based 0n

p.21.)

was moose meat.

1.)

ofﬁcer also testiﬁed that neither Huckabay nor

in Idaho.” (Id., p.239, L.8

A

moose

(id., p.

statute requires that there

127).

motion “for an order dismissing the indictment” under I.C.R.

also ﬁled a

other things, that there

be a

was insufﬁcient evidence

12(b),

for a probable cause ﬁnding,

the prosecutor misinstructed the grand jury, and the indictment failed t0 specify an exact charge.

(Id.,

pp.1 14-24, 138-140.)

The
jurisdiction

district court

denied the motions, concluding the indictment conferred subject matter

0n the court and

that the state “adequately advised” the

grand jury.

(Id.,

p.233.)

The

court additionally concluded that the evidence presented to the grand jury “was sufﬁcient to

2

Prior t0 this case, the state ﬁled an information charging

possession, based on the

p.380, n.2.)

same

incident,

Which the

district court

Huckabay

for felony unlawful

dismissed prior to

trial.

(E R.,

establish probable cause to believe that the Defendant unlawfully possessed a

the evidence

was insufﬁcient

(emphasis added).) The

deem
(Id.,

appropriate.”

to establish” that

district court

moose

“killed the

in question.”

ordered the state to ﬁle an amended indictment as

Huckabay moved

(Id.)

Huckabay

moose; however,

for reconsideration,

Which the

“it

(Id.

may

district court denied.

pp.286-88, 324-65, 392-406.)

The

state

moved

amend

to

the indictment.

(1d,,

p.235.)

proposed t0 delete the

It

“unlawfully kill” language, and instead allege that Huckabay “did unlawfully possess a Wild

animal with a single damage assessment of more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), to Wit:

by

gutting, quartering and/or transporting a

(Id.,

p.243.)

The

district court

Huckabay moved
other things, that

it

cow moose

in a closed season and/or Without a tag.”

granted the state’s motion to

to dismiss the

amend the

amended indictment

failed “t0 charge the necessary elements

confer jurisdiction, and

(id.,

Huckabay moved

(Id.,

(Id.,

p.322.)

pp.366-88), alleging,

among

of unlawful possession,” failed t0

was not supported by probable cause

denied the motion to dismiss.

indictment.

(id.,

p.384).

The

district court

pp.392-406.)

for the district court’s permission to appeal

denial 0f his motion for reconsideration and motion t0 dismiss the

pp.407-11.) The district court denied the motion.

(Id.,

from the

amended

pp.434-35.) Huckabay

district court’s

indictment.

moved

this

(Id.,

Court

for permission t0 appeal. (1d,, p.437.) This Court denied the motion. (Id., p.438.)

Prior to

trial,

the state

moved to amend the

proposed deleting “the language in there 0f
for conviction in this case,”

amended indictment

indictment again.

‘gut, quarter or transport,

(Id.,

3”

p.493.)

The prosecutor

which was “not necessary

and did not “change[] the offense.” (TL, p.74, Ls.4-24.) The second

alleged that

Huckabay “did unlawfully possess a Wild animal With a

damage assessment 0f more than one thousand

dollars ($1,000.00), to-wit:

A

single

cow moose

in

closed season and/or Without a tag.” (R., pp.577—578.)

amended indictment
L.1

(id.,

pp. 521-23),

which the

Huckabay moved

district court

to dismiss the

second

denied (TL, p.702, L.13 — p.703,

1).

The case went

Huckabay

t0 trial

0n the second amended indictment.

guilty of unlawful possession 0f a wild animal.

(R.,

(Id.,

pp.588-637.)

A jury found

The

district court

p.668.)

sentenced Huckabay t0 a uniﬁed sentence of two years With one year ﬁxed, and placed Huckabay

on probation.

(Id.,

p.716.)

The

district court

ordered a ﬁne, revoked Huckabay’s hunting and

ﬁshing license for a few years, and ordered Huckabay to serve 30 days ofjail time.

Huckabay timely appeals from

the

judgment of conviction.

(Id.,

(Id.)

pp.71 1-14, 733-37.)

ISSUES
Huckabay
.

Does

states the issues

on appeal

the possession of a single

as:

cow moose

constitute a felony under I.C. § 36-

1401(c)(3)?

.

Were

the Indictments fatally deﬁcient, thereby either failing to impart jurisdiction

to the district court 0r depriving

.

Huckabay of due process?

Did prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury invalidate the Indictment,
deprive Huckabay of due process, and deprive Huckabay of his right to an
independent probable cause determination?

.

Were

the district court’s instructions fatally deﬁcient because they failed to

include the essential elements of the offense?

(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Huckabay

II.

Has Huckabay

show
moose is

failed t0

possession 0f a single

failed t0

show

by concluding that the unlawful
Code Section 36-1401(c)(3)?

the district court erred

a felony under Idaho

the indictments were legally insufﬁcient, under either a

subj ect matter jurisdiction 0r a due process theory?

III.

Has Huckabay failed t0 show purported grand jury defects are reviewable following his
fair trial 0n the merits? Alternatively, even assuming such errors are reviewable, has he
failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss for
purported prosecutorial misconduct during the grand jury?

Has Huckabay

failed to

show

the district court erred

when

it

instructed the jury?

ARGUMENT
I.

The Unlawful Possession Of A Single Moose Constitutes A Felony Under The Plain Language
Of Idaho Code Section 36-1401(c)(3)
A.

Introduction

Nearly

all

of Huckabay’s arguments on appeal

claims “the unlawful possession of a single

cow moose

ﬂow
is

from a single mistaken premise: he

not a felony under LC. § 36-1401(c)(3)

because the statute requires a ‘combination 0f numbers or species.”

Huckabay purports

that for a variety

of reasons

this

(Appellant’s brief, p5.)

can only mean two or more animals, and, as

such, the district court adopted3 an “erroneous interpretation of LC. § 36-1401(c)(3)”
“declin[ed] t0 dismiss the felony charge.”

1401(c)(3)

is

incorrect.

Section 36-1401(c)(3)

that the unlawful possession

would cover a

single

statute is unconstitutionally

3

Finally,

Huckabay claims

unambiguous and

is

of a single moose constitutes a felony.

Court concludes that Section 36-1401(c)(3)
the statute

p.16.)

void for vagueness as the State applied the statute to Huckabay.”

is

This

(Id.,

is

its

that

(Id.,

When

“LC.

§

it

36-

p.15.)

plain language

shows

Alternatively, even if this

ambiguous, the most reasonable construction of

moose. Lastly, Huckabay

fails t0

meet

his

burden

t0

show

the

void for vagueness.

Huckabay’s brief does not clearly state which adverse ruling 0r purported district court error he
appealing from in this section. Sixteen pages into the brieﬁng, he simply states that the state

is

was erroneously
interpretation
set

interpreting I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3),

and declining

of consequences than most persons

denying his

Who engaged

The state Will liberally construe
numerous motions to dismiss.

brief, p.16.)

and

that the district court,

to dismiss the felony charge,

in the

this as a

by adopting

this

exposed Huckabay “t0 a much harsher

same alleged conduct.” (Appellant’s
claim that the

district court erred in

Standard

B.

The

Of Review

interpretation

and construction 0f a

appellate court exercises free review.

1117 (2004); State

Where
novo. State

V.

V.

Dom, 140

State V.

statute present questions

0f law over which the

Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115,

Idaho 404, 405, 94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).

the constitutionality of a statute

Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 71

1,

is

challenged, the appellate court reviews

de

69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003).

A

Single

statute; those

words

Section 36-1401(c)(3) Unambiguously Covers The Unlawful Possession

C.

it

Of

Moose
Statutory interpretation “must begin With the literal

must be given

their plain, usual,

whole. If the statute
as written.”

Verska

is

words of the

and ordinary meaning; and the

statute

not ambiguous, this Court does not construe

V. Saint

Alphonsus Reg’l Med.

Ctr.,

it,

must be construed

as a

but simply follows the law

151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506

(2011) (quoting State V. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) (citations

omitted)).

Section 36-1401(c)(3)

(c)

Felonies.

is plain.

Any person Who

It

states in relevant part:

pleads guilty

to, is

found guilty or

is

convicted 0f a

Violation 0f the following offenses shall be guilty of a felony:

3.

Unlawfully

killing,

possessing 0r wasting 0f any combination 0f numbers 0r

species of Wildlife within a twelve (12) month period which has a single or
combined reimbursable damage assessment 0f more than one thousand dollars
($1,000), as provided in section 36-1404, Idaho Code.

LC.

§ 36-1401(c)(3)

(emphasis added).

This language

grant,

is

unambiguous.

“Any combination of numbers”

which would include the number “one.”

referenced Section 36-1404, one

moose has

And nobody

is

a broad inclusive

disputes that, per the cross-

a single reimbursable

damage assessment

that

exceeds $1,000. LC.
language of these

Huckabay
notes that a

things.”

0r

§

statute.

show otherwise on

fails t0

common

in other sections

indication

it

He

the

Cracking open a dictionary, Huckabay

also points out that the legislature used the phrase “one (1)

0f Title 36; as such, he reasons use of “combination” here

“is

intended that possession 0f one animal would not Violate the statute.”

ﬁnal stop in Huckabay’s argument

mean one

appeal.

deﬁnition of “combination” would be “an act 0f combining two 0r more

(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

more”

Thus, unlawful possession of one moose satisﬁes the plain

36-1404(2).

is

his conclusion that

plus zero in LC. § 36-1401(c)(3)

modiﬁer ‘one

(1) or

This claim

more’

fails

t0

to describe

When

€66

legislature

persuade for several reasons.

of Title 36 the legislature used

meant

for a single item.” (Id.)

First,

it

refuses to face a cold

arithmetical reality: the statute expressly covers any combination of numbers.

1401(c)(3) (emphasis added). Zero, as

it

happens,

a number.

is

The

(Id.)

combination’ cannot be construed to

in other sections

When the

a clear

One

is

LC.

a number, too.

§

And

36-

it is

possible t0 combine these numbers: zero plus one equals one.

Should

this

equation need any bolstering,

at least

one

state

supreme

court,

and the United

States Courts 0f Appeals for the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,

and Tenth

where “the judge must add two numbers together,” an amount

properly added “in addition” to

zero—because “zero
United States

V.

is

is

circuits all agree that

a number.” United States V. Favorito, 5 F.3d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1993);

Aguilera, 48 F.3d 327, 329 (8th Cir. 1995) (adopting the

“common-sense

conclusion” that “a ﬁne in the amount 0f zero dollars furnishes the required statutory predicate
for an ‘additional ﬁne’”); United States V. Turner,

States V. Sellers,

42 F.3d 116, 119 (2d

the judge to add

two numbers

Cir.

together,

998 F.2d 534, 538 (7th

Cir. 1993);

United

1994) (holding “the word ‘additional’ simply requires

and ‘zero

is

a number’”).

As

the Tenth Circuit put

it,

“Zero

is

Tr. Inc.,

a number, not the absence of one.” Mem’l Hosp. of Laramie Ctv.

509 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th

NOTHING THAT

M,

Is:

Cir.

A NATURAL HISTORY 0F ZERO

Applying

is

a

Healthcare Realty

2007) (emphasis added, citing Robert Kaplan, THE

90—1 15 (1999));

962 P.2d 203, 204 (Ariz. 1998) (“While “monetary

excess of zero, zero

V.

ﬂ

relief”

also Farmers Ins. Co. v.

may

suggest a

number

in

number too.”).

this principle in Tu_rner,

Judge Easterbrook examined a

statute that instructed

“the court t0 ‘impose an additional ﬁne’ adequate t0 cover the costs of imprisonment.” 998 F.2d

The appellant argued where

at 537.

power to impose “additional” ﬁnes.

An

“additional”

the court

Li.

imposed no imprisonment ﬁnes, the court had no

The Seventh

ﬁne doubtless means

Circuit did the

that the

math and disagreed:

judge must add two numbers

number. There is n0 semantic inconsistency in treating §
5E1 .2(i) as a command t0 add the costs 0f incarceration to whatever ﬁne the court
imposes under § 5E1.2(c), including a ﬁne of zero.

together, but zero is a

Li. at 538.

That same basic arithmetic controls the issue here. Section 36-1401(c)(3) broadly covers

“any combination 0f numbers,” and zero
statute,

one moose can

satisfy the

is

a number.

Thus, under the plain language 0f the

“combination of numbers” element, and

it is

undisputed that

one moose has a single reimbursable damage value exceeding $1,000. LC. §§ 36-1401(c)(3); 361404(2).

Moreover, Huckabay’s reading of the
blind eye to a chunk of the statute.
species “which has a single 0r

1401(c)(3) (emphasis added).

multiple animals: one animal

On

The

statute

cannot be the plain one, insofar as

statute expressly refers t0 a

face, this

shows

turns a

combination 0f numbers or

combined reimbursable damage assessment.”
its

it

that the statute could

I.C.

§

36-

encompass one 0r

would have a “single” assessment, and multiple animals would

10

have a “combined” assessment.
“single 0r

combined”

is

Huckabay does not attempt

Li.

to explain

how

the language

a reference that plainly refers only t0 groups of animals.

(E

Appellant’s brief, pp. 1 - 1 7.)

Finally,

Huckabay’s guesswork about the

0f Title 36 reveals that he
brief, p.7.)

legislature’s “intent” in drafting other sections

(E Appellant’s

not grappling with this statute’s plain language.

is

This Court has “consistently held that Where statutory language

legislative history

is

unambiguous,

and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose 0f altering

the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.” Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at

(quoting City 0f

As

Sun Valley

Sun Valley

V.

C0,, 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)).

such, Huckabay’s attempt t0 divine the plain

meaning 0f Section 36-1401(c)(3) based on the

legislature’s “intent” in other sections gets things entirely backwards.

Section 36-1401(c)(3)

by journeying

is

on

plain

t0 other sections

is

face, this

0f the code.

Huckabay’s reading of the
bending premise that zero

its

506

Because the meaning of

Court should not be construing

it

in the ﬁrst place

Li.

statute is not plain

and

it

certainly fails.

It

hinges on a mind-

not a number; asks this Court to ignore the “single or combined

value” language right there in the statute; and requires this Court to “construe” plain text based

0n other

statute’s plain

D.

There

statutory language.

meaning and conclude

Even
Construction Of The

Alternatively,

Possession

Where

Of A

is

This Court should simply adopt the

that a single animal ﬁts within

Statute Is

it.

Ambiguous, The Only Reasonable
That The Legislature Intended It To Cover The Unlawful

If Section

Single

an easier path.

36-1401(c)(3)

Is

Moose

a statute’s words “are subject to

Court must construe the statute

‘to

mean What

more than one meaning,
the legislature intended

11

it is

it

t0

ambiguous and

this

mean. T0 determine

that intent,

[this

Court] examine[s] not only the

literal

words 0f the

statute,

reasonableness 0f proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and
history.’”

Ada

Ctv.

(2017) (quoting

A

Highway

Doe

V.

BOV

Dist. V.

Brooke View,

legislative

Scouts 0f America, 148 Idaho 427, 430, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009)).

is

that “the

meaning 0f a word cannot be

determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in Which

508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993). Courts “follow the cardinal rule

whole” because “the meaning of statutory language, plain or
St.

its

162 Idaho 138, 142, 395 P.3d 357, 361

Inc.,

“fundamental principle of statutory construction”

m,

but also the

not,

it is

used.” Deal V. United

that a statute is to

be read as a

depends on context.” K_ingi

Vincent’s Hosp, 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991).
In the alternative, if this Court concludes Section 36-1401(c)(3)

reasonable construction of

it is

that

is

ambiguous, the most

“any combination of numbers” includes one animal.

starting point is the context surrounding the phrase. K_ing,

502 U.S.

at

221.

reference to “single 0r combined reimbursable” damage, in the very

As

The

already noted, the

same sentence,

is

a giant

clue that the legislature intended for Section 36-1401(c)(3) to cover single animals as well as

groups of them.

The

legislative history

demands a

similar conclusion.

legislature’s statements about “increas[ing] the reimbursable

While Huckabay ﬁxates 0n the

damages,” and “catch[ing] up with

inﬂation 0n penalties,” in this context ﬁscal statements cut both ways.

reimbursable damage amount
a felony.

is

is

no indication

reimbursable damage

limit,

it

The

What determines Whether the unlawful possession of an animal

LC. §§ 36-1401(c)(3); 36-1404.

such, there

(E R., pp.81, 87.)

Legislators

knew this—they wrote

that the legislature did not understand that

was

by

the statute.

raising

As

moose’s

creating a felony for the unlawful possession 0f one moose.

12

is

Moreover, the clearest expression of legislative history on Section 36-1401(c)(3) shows
the understanding that

House

Bill n0. 278,

moose from

it

covered one moose.

In 2003, the State Affairs

Which would have amended Section 36-1401(c)(3)

Committee discussed

t0 “exclude the taking

The statement of

certain penalties.” (Supp. R., pp.37-38 (capitalization altered).)

purpose was plain: “This legislation would amend Idaho Code 36-1401(c)

for unlawfully

killing,

possessing 0r wasting a moose from a felony

p.38 (emphasis added).)

argued in favor 0f
With a felony.”

it

(Id.,

Though

t0

t0

reduce the penalty

a misdemeanor.”

states that

anyone

who

kills

(Id.,

Campbell

the bill ultimately did not pass, Representative

because “current law

of

a moose will be charged

p.35 (emphasis added).)

Thus, the legislative history
construed, applies to one moose.

is

more evidence

just

that Section 36-1401(c)(3), properly

Moreover, because there

uncertainty” in Section 36-1401(c)(3) that “is not resolved

or policy of the statute,” the rule 0f lenity

no “grievous ambiguity or

is

by looking

would not apply

here.

at the text, context, history

State V.

Bradshaw, 155 Idaho

437, 440, 313 P.3d 765, 768 (Ct. App. 2013).

Assuming Huckabay

is

arguing the statute

is

proposed constructions truly reﬂect the intent of the
15.)

Two

ambiguous, he
legislature.

fails to

show

that

any 0f his

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.10-

of his ﬂawed arguments warrant further remark.

Huckabay claims

that the “district court’s

interpretation creates a conﬂict

between

statutes”—namely, the purported conﬂict between Section 36-1401(c)(3) one-moose felony
penalty,

ﬁne

at

and Section 36-1402(c)(2)’s

“$500.” (Appellant’s

entirely artiﬁcial.

list

0f misdemeanor ﬁnes, which pegs the

brief, pp.9-1 1.)

But

this

minimum moose

purported conﬂict between these statutes

is

Huckabay’s quote from Section 36-1402(c)(2) leads the reader astray With a

crucial elision—he conveniently omits the language that

13

harmonizes the two

statutes.

(E

id.,

p.10.)

Restoring the text Huckabay lopped

off,

highlighted in boldface, shows that there

is

n0

conﬂict:

(c)

Misdemeanor

Penalty.

Any

person entering a plea of guilty

0f or convicted of a misdemeanor under the provisions of
proclamations promulgated pursuant thereto

higher penalty
dollars

nor more than

($25.00)

commitment to jail
animal, ﬁsh or bird,

LC.

Moose

§ 36-1402(c)(2)

not less than twenty—ﬁve
($1,000)

months. The

six (6)

found guilty

except in cases where a

sum of

one thousand dollars

more than

for not

and/or by

minimum

ﬁne, per

for the illegal taking, illegal possession or the illegal waste of

the following animals,

ﬁne...

shall,

prescribed, be ﬁned in a

is

for,

this title or rules or

ﬁsh or birds

shall

be as indicated below

minimum

$500.

(emphasis added).

Thus, Section 36-1402 expressly contemplates that misdemeanor penalties would apply
“except in cases where a higher penalty

for

“moose,” as the “minimum.”

Li.

prescribed”;

is

This

left

the reimbursable value of

pp.81-83.) There

Huckabay

is

moose

at

$1,500

When

n0 conﬂict between these

additionally claims,

Wide open

the door

“higher penalties”—such as felony penalties—which

it

is

also sets forth the ﬁnes, such as the

it

ﬁne

for the legislature t0 prescribe

exactly what the legislature did

amended Section 36-1404

in 1999.

by

setting

(E R.,

statutes.

without citation:

evidence of its interpretation 0f a statute.” (Appellant’s

“An

agency’s conduct

brief, p.8.)

is

the best

This approach would clearly

misallocate separated powers, insofar as the legislature drafts statutes and this Court construes

them according

to the legislature’s intent.

Idaho Const.

art. II, §

1.

While executive agencies

undoubtedly enforce the law, those enforcement patterns, whatever they

how

this

Court construes

impermissibly

arrogate

Redevelopment Agency

statutes, or

What those

statutes

and

legislative

power

judicial

V.

mean.
to

the

are,

should not dictate

T0 hold otherwise would
executive.

E

Boise

Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 885, 499 P.2d 575, 584 (1972)

14

(holding “the legislative department cannot delegate any 0f

body 0r

its

power

t0

make laws

t0

any other

authority)).

In any event, even if Fish

&

Game’s enforcement

patterns should inﬂuence

Court construes Section 36-1401(c)(3), the “patterns” Huckabay

Huckabay

attaches reams 0f arrest records he obtained

“[a]m0ng the 238 separate moose
involved felony charges.”

arrests”

it

cites to

from Fish

&

how

this

are uninformative.

Game, showing

that

documented “between 1999 and 2016, only 35

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

He

thinks this shows “that

members of the

agency interpreted” Section 36-1401(c)(3) “to require two 0r more big game animals

to charge a

felony.” (Id.)

Not
of wildlife.

so.

The vast majority 0f misdemeanors

(E

id.,

Addendum

pp.1-1

1.)

And

pursue, catch, capture, shoot, ﬁsh, seine, trap,

202(h)(i).

“take”

kill,

Thus,

is

enforcement records involve “takings”
broadly deﬁned in the Code as “hunt,

0r possess 0r any attempt t0 so do.” LC. § 36-

Section 36-1401(c)(3), 0n the other hand,

killing, possessing, 0r wasting.

in the

in the

is

much

narrower;

it is

only triggered by

we have no way of knowing how many of the moose

cases

enforcement records that were charged as misdemeanor takings could have been charged

under Section 36-1401(c)(3) t0 begin With. This has nothing to do With amount of moose;
because

we have no way from knowing, from

it is

the face of the records, whether a particular taking

was also a killing, possession, 0r wasting.
The enforcement

records, therefore,

tell

us nothing.

Every charge

that alleges a taking

As

such, this apples-to-

potentially implicates a set 0f facts outside of Section 36-1401(c)(3).

oranges comparison

falls far short

Whoever they might

of showing “persuasive evidence that members of the agency,”

be, “interpreted

LC.

§

36-1401(c)(3)” any particular

15

way

at all.

(m

Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

construction,

Even assuming agency enforcement

n0 relevant patterns have been shown

Section 36-1401(c)(3)

if the text is

is plain,

ambiguous the

and

is

patterns

should aid statutory

here.

plainly satisﬁed

Alternatively, even

by one animal.

legislature’s intent is clear: Section 36-1401(c)(3) is intended t0

This Court should give effect t0 the legislature’s intent and construe the

cover one animal.

statute accordingly.

E.

Huckabav

Fails

T0 Meet His Burden T0 Show That

Section

36-1401(c)(3)

Is

Unconstitutional

“[T]he void-for-Vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute deﬁne the criminal
offense with sufﬁcient deﬁniteness that ordinary people can understand What conduct

prohibited and in a

manner

that does not

State V. Knutsen, 158 Idaho 199, 202,

345 P.3d 989, 992 (2015) (quoting Kolender

notice, but the other principal element

establish

encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”

“[T]he more important aspect 0f vagueness doctrine

461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).

minimal guidelines

t0

is

V.

‘is

Lawson,

not actual

0f the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature

govern law enforcement.”

Li. (quoting

Kolender, 461 U.S.

at

358).

As

a constitutional matter “[a] conviction 0r punishment

if the statute 0r regulation

under Which

it

is

obtained

fails t0

‘fails to

provide a person 0f ordinary

intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that

seriously discriminatory enforcement.”

253 (2012) (quoting United States

V.

comply with due process

it

authorizes 0r encourages

F.C.C. V. Fox Television Stations,

Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).

Inc.,

567 U.S. 239,

Accordingly, “the

void-for-Vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and (2) arbitrary and
discriminatory prosecutions.”

Skilling V. United States, 561

16

U.S. 358, 412 (2010) (citing

Kolender, 461 U.S.

and the court must,

validity

But the doctrine also grants

at 357).

if possible, “construe,

Even

quotes and citations omitted).

(internal

“imprecise” that fact has

statutes a “strong

statute’s

402-403

at

“outermost boundaries” are

relevance Where “appellant’s conduct

little

EQ

not condemn” them.

if a

presumption” of

squarely Within the

falls

‘hard core’ of the statute’s prescriptions.” Broadrick V. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973).

The party challenging

the constitutionality 0f the

presumption 0f constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity 0f the
at

71

69 P.3d

1,

upholds

its

The

at 131.

the statute

brief, pp.15-18.)

However,

is

it is

void for vagueness.

for all the reasons explained above,

person of ordinary intelligence

less

Huckabay

fair notice

of what

is

prohibited, 0r

at

The

253.

statute is plain,

understand what conduct

fails to

show

is

prohibited.”

is

that there is a pattern

158 Idaho

at

it

show

“fails to

that the

provide a

so standardless that

Fox Television

and has “sufﬁcient deﬁniteness

m,

(Appellant’s,

fails t0

does he meet his burden t0 show that

authorizes 0r encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”

it

Stations, Inc.,

that ordinary people

can

202, 345 P.3d at 992. Moreover,

0f arbitrary or discriminatory prosecution.

mentioned, his citation to historical moose-misdemeanor cases

all,

138 Idaho

presumption” cutting against his position,

unconstitutional because

even ambiguous—much

Huckabay

m,

obligated to seek a construction of a statute that

is

citation t0 the operative “strong

Huckabay claims

567 U.S.

statute.

constitutionality. Li.

With no

statute is

appellate court

must overcome a strong

statute

fails t0

show a

As

relevant pattern at

insofar as the vast majority 0f those charges are “takings,” and are not necessarily under the

ambit 0f Section 36-1401(c)(3).

Huckabay

fails to

(E

Appellant’s brief,

overcome the strong presumption

17

Addendum

pp.1-1

1.)

that the statute is constitutional.

As

such,

II.

Huckabay Fails To Show The Indictments, Which Conferred Subject Matter Jurisdiction And
Did Not Lead To Due Process Violations, Were Legally Insufﬁcient
A.

Introduction

Huckabay

incorrectly contends that “[n]0ne 0f the three indictments in this case imparted

jurisdiction in the district court because each of

them

failed to allege that the offense involved a

‘combination of numbers 0f species of wildlife’ as required” by Section 36-1401(c)(3), insofar as

“each of the indictments alleged that the offense involved a single moose.” (Appellant’s

p.

1

8.)

Huckabay

similarly argues that the indictments “failed to satisfy due process.”

(Id.,

brief,

p.20.)

These arguments are unavailing. As explained above, the unlawﬁll possession 0f a single

moose

constitutes a felony under Section 36-1401(c)(3).

As

such,

all

of the indictments, alleging

a Section 36-1401(c)(3) Violation, conferred subject matter jurisdiction.

Moreover, Huckabay

fails t0

forth the elements 0f the crime

alleged

means of committing

prejudiced

B.

when

Standard

the indictments

_,

1255, 1257 (201
the law”

is

and clearly indicated the

Beyond

Violations.

The indictments

facts giving rise t0 the offense

all set

and the

Huckabay comes nowhere near showing he was

that,

were amended.

Of Review

Jurisdiction

Idaho 768,

it.

show any due process

is

“a question 0f law” that

367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016)
1)).

is

reviewed de novo.

(citing State V. Lute,

State V. Schmierer, 159

150 Idaho 837, 839, 252 P.3d

Likewise, “Whether a charging document conforms t0 the requirements of

reviewed de novo. State

V.

Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 708, 215 P.3d 414, 428 (2009).

18

The Indictments Conferred Subiect Matter

C.

“Subject matter jurisdiction

dispute.”

omitted).

State V. Lute,

is

the

Jurisdiction

power t0 determine cases over a general type 0r

150 Idaho 837, 840, 252 P.3d 1255, 1258 (201

Idaho courts have “subject matter jurisdiction over a crime

the crime, including the result, occurs within Idaho.”

if

1) (internal

0f

quotes

any essential element of

State V. Doyle, 121 Idaho 911, 914, 828

“The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was

P.2d 1316, 1319 (1992).

committed Within the State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court.”
Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004), quoted

1,

class

_, 368 P.3d 621, 626 (2016); ﬂ 211$ Idaho Const.

art.

I,

i_n

§ 8

m

State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

(“No person

shall

be held t0

answer for any felony 0r criminal offense 0f any grade, unless 0n presentment 0r indictment 0f a
grand jury or on information 0f the public prosecutor[.]”). “‘Since the indictment 0r information
provides subject matter jurisdiction t0 the court, the court’s jurisdictional power depends on the

charging document being legally sufﬁcient t0 survive challenge.” Schmierer, 159 Idaho at

367 P.3d

at

165 (quoting State

legally sufﬁcient, a charging

and

satisfy

due process.”

V. Jones,

140 Idaho 755, 758, 101 P.3d 699, 702 (2004)). “‘To be

document must meet two requirements:

Li. (quoting

The

The

district court

original indictment alleged

KILLING OR POSSESION OF A MOOSE”
1404(a)(2).” (R., p.21.)

ﬁrst and second

(Id.,

in Violation

all

had subj ect matter jurisdiction

“UNLAWFUL

of “Idaho Code §36-1401(c)(3), §36-

amended indictments

pp.243, 577.) Because

committed within the State of Idaho,

must impart jurisdiction

Huckabay committed

“UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WILD ANIMAL”
1401(c)(3), §36-1404(a)(2).”

it

Severson, 147 Idaho at 708, 215 P.3d at 428).

Contrary to Huckabay’s claims on appeal, the
over the charge here.

_,

all

alleged

in Violation

Huckabay committed

of “Idaho Code §36-

three indictments alleged an offense

three indictments imparted the district court with subj ect

19

matter jurisdiction over the unlawful possession charge.

P.3d

at

428 (“An indictment confers jurisdiction when

m,

criminal offense in the State 0f Idaho.”);

Lin, 153 Idaho 891, 893, 292 P.3d 282, 284
jurisdiction if

Idaho”).

it

alleges that the defendant

Because the

district court

(Ct.

it

E

Severson, 147 Idaho at 708, 215

alleges that the defendant

140 Idaho

228, 91 P.3d at 1132;

at

App. 2012)

m

committed a

document “confers

(a charging

committed a criminal offense within the State of

had subject matter jurisdiction over the unlawful possession

charges, the court correctly denied Huckabay’s motions to dismiss the indictments based

alleged lack ofjurisdiction.

upon an

(E, gg, R., pp.231-32.)

Huckabay makes one argument

here.

Retreading familiar ground, he contends that

“[n]one of the three indictments in this case imparted jurisdiction in the

district court

because

each of them failed t0 allege that the that the offense involved a ‘combination of numbers or
species of Wildlife’

as required t0

(Appellant’s brief, p.18.)

LC.

constitute a felony pursuant t0

Huckabay claims

§

36-1401(c)(3).”

the court lacked jurisdiction because, “[i]nstead, each

0f the indictments alleged that the offense involved a single moose.”

(Id.)

This claim has

already been refuted herein.

Huckabay

cites to State V.

jurisdictional claim.

(Id.,

deﬁcient because

it

the felony

Li. at

circular,

4

itself.

Hughes, 161 Idaho 826, 392 P.3d 4

m

was

alleged the ﬂagrant Violation (Which converted the charge into a felony) as

832-33, 392 P.3d

which has n0 relevance

explained there, this

at 10-1 1.

The

to the jurisdictional question (or

Huckabay’s other Hughesian claim

As

App. 2014), for his

There, the Court 0f Appeals held the state’s information

p.19.)

quote 0f Section 36-1401(c)(3).
III.D.3.

(Ct.

(E
is

is

that the indictments

Court held that language was

any other question) here.4

were required

Appellant’s brief, p.19.) That claim

not what Hughes says.
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to contain a

is

verbatim

addressed in section

However, Hughes does have relevance here—just not

does not bother to mention

animal—a

single

is

I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3).”

that the

had alleged

(Appellant’s brief, p.19.)

Hughes Court unmistakably concluded

“buck mule deer”—w0uld

If the information

way Huckabay

again, that “a Violation involving a single

Huckabay has repeatedly argued, over and over
does not constitute a felony under

in the

that

thinks.

moose

What he

that a single

satisfy Section 36-1401(c)(3):

Hughes

killed, possessed, or

wasted the mule

deer by one of the acts enumerated in LC. § 36—1402(e)(1—5), then the charged
felony under I.C. § 36—1401 (c)(3) would be appropriate since the mule deer also
qualiﬁed as a trophy game animal, thus falling within the $2,000 reimbursable

damage assessment.
161 Idaho at 833, 392 P.3d at 11 (emphasis added).

Hughes makes

it

crystal clear: contrary t0 everything

Huckabay has argued

began, a single animal meeting the reimbursable damage amount
Section 36-1401(c)(3).

central thesis

that

fatally

392 P.3d

fails t0

ﬂawed,

show

appropriately charged under

So the only relevant takeaway from Hughes
for yet another reason.

charge predicated on a single animal

Huckabay

D.

is

Li.

is

is

since this case

is

that

Huckabay’s

Because the Court of Appeals concluded

“appropriate” under Section 36-1401(c)(3),

the indictment failed t0 confer jurisdiction.

Hughes, 161 Idaho

at

833,

at 11.

HuckabaV Fails T0 Show Amending The Indictments Violated His Due Process Rights

An

indictment satisﬁes due process

‘enable a person of

common

double jeopardy.” State

when

understanding to

V. Jones,

State V. Grady, 89 Idaho 204, 209,

it

“contains ‘factual speciﬁcity adequate to

know what

is

intended’ and t0 shield against

140 Idaho 755, 758, 101 P.3d 699, 701, 702 (2004) (quoting

404 P.2d 347, 349—50 (1965)). “Due process requires

that

an

indictment be speciﬁc enough t0 ensure that the defendant has a meaningful opportunity t0
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prepare his defense and to protect the defendant from a subsequent prosecution for the same act.”

Severson, 147 Idaho at 709, 215 P.3d at 429; State

V.

Gumm

99 Idaho 549, 551, 585 P.2d 959,

961 (1978). Consequently, “an indictment must d0 more than simply
Severson, 147 Idaho at 709, 215 P.3d

at

429; State

V.

McMahan

159—60 (1937).

It

means by Which

the defendant committed the alleged crime.”

P.3d

at

must additionally “clearly indicate the

state the offense charged.

57 Idaho 240, 250, 65 P.2d 156,

facts giving rise to the offense 0r the

Severson, 147 Idaho at 709, 215

429 (footnote omitted).
Indictments

“may be amended

at

any time before the prosecution

rests

Without being

returned t0 the grand jury, so long as doing so does not prejudice the defendant’s substantial

ﬂ alﬂ

rights or charge the defendant With a

new

State V. O’Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 249,

796 P.2d 121, 126 (1990). Accordingly, “an amendment

that merely alleges additional

permissible if

it

offense.”

means by which

Li; I.C.R. 7(6);

the defendant

LC.

may have committed

does not prejudice the defendant.” Severson, 147 Idaho

at

§

19—1420;

the crime

is

709, 215 P.3d at 429

(emphasis added). Finally, the defendant has the burden t0 prove the facts underpinning his due
process claim.

State V. Jacobson, 150 Idaho 131, 134,

244 P.3d 630, 633

(Ct.

m

App. 2010)

the defendant’s burden t0 demonstrate facts that constitute a due process Violation”);

ﬂ

(“It is

CLtrell, 139 Idaho 409, 412, 80 P.3d 345, 348 (Ct. App. 2003).

The

ﬁrst indictment (R., pp.21-22) satisﬁed due process.

It

set forth the

elements of the

crime and “clearly indicate[d] the facts giving rise to the offense or the means by Which the
defendant committed the alleged crime.”

Huckabay argues

that per

mm,

Severson,

the ﬁrst indictment (and

“any combination of numbers” of Wildlife unlawfully

Huckabay

is

147 Idaho

misreading Hughes and the

statute.
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all

at

709, 215 P.3d at 429.

the indictments) failed t0 allege

killed, but,

One moose can

as already demonstrated,

satisfy Section 36-1401(c)(3),

and Huckabay comes nowhere near showing
notice that one

The

moose was

at

indictments—which consistently put him on

issue—deprived him 0f due process.

amended indictment

ﬁrst

that the

(R.,

pp.243-44) likewise satisﬁed due process.

It

set forth

the elements of the crime and “clearly indicate[d] the facts giving rise to the offense or the

by which
429.

the defendant committed the alleged crime.”

Moreover, the

state’s

charge the defendant with a

case, deleting the allegation that

p.243.)

he

offense.” Li. Indeed, the state

Huckabay unlawfully killed

the crime prejudiced him;

beneﬁt to have fewer allegations to defend against
at

forth the elements of the crime

means by Which
at

429.

(Compare

“additional

ﬂ

R., p.21

means by Which”

only inures t0 the defendant’s

Severson, 147 Idaho at 709, 215

pp.577—78) likewise satisﬁed due process.

and “clearly indicate[d] the

It

set

facts giving rise t0 the offense 0r the

Severson, 147 Idaho at 709, 215

This round 0f amendments did not “prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights or

Huckabay possessed

R., p.243

(R.,

the defendant committed the alleged crime.”

charge the defendant with a

that

E

it

theories 0f the

429.

The second amended indictment

P.3d

the moose.

by deﬁnition,
at trial.

substantial rights or

removed one 0f its

Huckabay cannot conceivably argue how a removal of an

may have committed

P.3d

Severson, 147 Idaho at 709, 215 P.3d at

amendments did not “prejudice the defendant’s

new

means

m

the

new

offense,” because, again, the state

moose “by

removed language alleging

gutting, quartering, and/or transporting”

it.

(Compare

p.577.)

Huckabay curiously argues
Huckabay from

that

“Defense counsel had prepared a strategy to defend

these allegations at the jury trial,” speciﬁcally pertaining to “gutting, quartering,

and/or transporting,” and the second

0f the defense was

t0

amendment

“resulted in prejudice to

Huckabay because

focus 0n exploiting these unsupported allegations.”
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part

(Appellant’s brief,

pp.38-39 (emphasis added).)

But

made, Huckabay n0 longer had

to focus his defense

(E
What

id.,

it

How

pp.577-78.)

to focus

the state narrows

on

“gutting, quartering, and/or transporting.”

the scope of issues at

on and defend against? He never

its

second amendment was

could the state have prejudiced Huckabay by reducing the scope of

was claiming, narrowing

Huckabay

that is exactly the point: after the

theory of the case

it

trial,

and creating fewer allegations for

But

says.

it

goes without saying that

when

beneﬁts the defendant—and Huckabay comes nowhere

near meeting his burden 0f showing his due process rights were violated. Jacobson, 150 Idaho at

134,

244 P.3d

at

633.

Huckabay

spills additional

due process rights because

it

ink arguing that the second

amended indictment

violated his

“failed t0 include” the following “essential elements”: “(1) that the

offense involved a combination of numbers 0r species of wildlife within a twelve-month period,

(2) that the

unlawful taking 0r killing 0f Wildlife had occurred as a predicate t0 unlawﬁll

possession, and (3) that

Huckabay knew

season, without a tag, or

arguments are

1.

all

incorrect

The Purported

Huckabay claims

that the

moose had been taken

by an unauthorized method.”
and will be taken up

Failure

there

To Allege

or killed during a closed

(Appellant’s brief, p.31.)

These

in turn.

A Combination Of Numbers Or Species

was a due process

Violation because the

second amended

indictment failed to allege “a combination of numbers or species of Wildlife Within a twelve-

month

period.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.31.)

This mistaken claim has been repeatedly

repeatedly refuted. Nothing ﬁthher needs t0 be said about
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it.

made and

The

2.

Failure

To Allege An Unlawful Taking Or

Killing

As

A Predicate

To Unlawful

Possession

Citing Section 36-502(b),

Huckabay argues

that “t0 satisfy the

was both possessed and unlawfully taken 0r

possession, an indictment must allege that wildlife

(Appellant’s brief, p.22 (emphasis added).)

killed.”

due process Violation.
This argument

He

claims this purported omission was a

(Id.)

because Huckabay’s attempt to engraft a “taking or killing” sub-

fails,

element into “possession” rewrites the plain language of the
provides that the state

LC.

§

element 0f unlawful

may

The

statute.

statute speciﬁcally

charge a defendant for “Unlawfully killing, possessing 0r wasting.”

36-1401(c)(3) (emphasis added). “The

word

‘or’ is

a ‘disjunctive particle used to express

an alternative or to give a choice 0f one among two 0r more things.’” State

V.

Idaho 593, 600, 416 P.3d 965, 972 (2018) (quoting Markel

Ltd

Idaho 107, 110, 279 P.3d 93, 96 (2012)). For example,

committed

in

Int’l Ins. C0.,

if a statute requires

an ‘aggressive, Violent, premeditated, or willful manner,

999

Cota-Medina, 163
V.

Erekson, 153

proof an “offense was
that “statute does not

require that the offense be committed in an aggressive, Violent, premeditated,

manner.”

Li.

Here—as

(emphasis in original).

the defendant violated the statute

Moreover, Huckabay

fails to

deﬁnition of “possession” here.

5

Nor does

this

in

that §

willful

may prove

But the

state is

order to prove possessions

LC. 36-502(b) has any bearing on the relevant

Section 36-502(b)

is

found in chapter

5,

which provides

proposed statement 0f law make sense as a metaphysical matter. One can clearly

prove possession makes as
in

killing 0r possessing the animal.

moose

show

possess something without having killed

marijuana

the statute clearly sets forth—the state

by unlawfully

not required t0 prove Huckabay killed the

and

much

it.

To

require the state t0 prove a killing in order to

sense as requiring the

order t0 prove possession.

possess marijuana without smoking

it.

As

One can

state, for

possess a

example, to prove a smoking of

moose Without

a matter of raw physics, this
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is

killing

it.

One can

how possession works.

“restrictions

0n possession,

transportation, sale

and use of Wildlife.” Section 36-502(b)

sets forth

a separate charge—“Unlawful possession”—which criminalizes the possession of “any wildlife

0r parts thereof protected

the provisions 0f this

by

and the taking or

title

killing

0f Which

is

unlawful.” LC. § 36-502(b).
Section 36-502(b), however, does not set forth

Q

Much

less

does

it

killing” sub-element.

state that

EQ

some novel deﬁnition of possession.

under Section 36-1401(c)(3), possession
Instead the statute simply

means What

it

now

E

has a “taking or

says:

it

establishes a

separate offense that criminalizes the possession of unlawfully killed or taken protected wildlife.

Li.

Accordingly, Huckabay

fails to

1401(c)(3), 0r that possession here

Huckabay next argues
thinks,

“that

it

was “impermissible

show

that Section 36-502(b) has

would have any other deﬁnition than

that the state

needed

to

the usual one.6

prove “taking or killing” because, he

circular reasoning” for the

Second Amended Indictment

t0 allege

Huckabay unlawfully possessed a Wild animal by possessing a moose.” (Appellant’s

pp.24-25.)

Huckabay

thinks that trying to “establish the felony that

possessed a moose simply by alleging that he possessed the moose”

(Id.,

any bearing 0n Section 36-

is

brief,

Huckabay unlawfully

“begging the question.”

pp.25-26.)

This

necessarily

is

nonsense.

In order to allege a crime of unlawful possession 0f any item, the state

must prove possession

as an element 0f the crime.

“Possession of a weapon by a minor,” the state
[had] in their possession” a ﬁrearm.

I.C. §

is

This

is

precisely Why, t0 prove

required to prove the minor “possess[ed] 0r

18-3302E(1) (emphasis).

This

is

why,

to

prove

“Possession, introduction 0r removal of certain articles into or from correctional facilities,” the

6

The

correct deﬁnition 0f “possession,” given t0 the jury,

below.
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is

discussed in detail in section IV.C.2

state

must prove a person “Possess[ed], or attempt[ed]

2510(1)(c) (emphasis added). This

Likewise,

it

was not

is

not “circular”—it

is

t0 possess” contraband.

LC.

§

18-

simply proving elements of the crime.

“circular” for the state t0 prove unlawﬁll possession here

alleging an

by

element of the crime: the possession element.

3.

Failure

To Allege

Huckabay claims

“knew

that the

A Knowledge Element

that the

second amended indictment was required to allege that he

moose had been taken

unauthorized method.”

or killed during a closed season, without a tag, 0r

(Appellant’s brief, p.31.)

element was a due process Violation.

He

thinks that failure t0 allege a

by an

knowledge

(Id.)

This one can be quickly dispatched. Section 36-1401(c)(3) does not require a knowledge
element. Unlike, say, Section 36-1401(c)(1), Which criminalizes “[k]knowingly and intentionally
selling or offering” certain wildlife, Section 36-1401(c)(3) does not require

“intentional” act.

It

Wildlife, full stop.

LC.

the statute

is

simply criminalizes “[u]nlawfully

misguided attempt

Huckabay points out

possessing 0r wasting” certain

Huckabay’s attempt to read a “knowledge” element into

§ 36-1401(c)(3).

just another

killing,

any “knowing” 0r

t0 rewrite its plain language.

that Idaho’s “legislature provided that for “every crime 0r public

offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, 0r criminal negligence.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.28 (citing I.C. § 18-1 14).) True enough.

The Idaho Supreme Court has already explained

rest

of the

LC.

14’” is a reference t0
§ 18-1

(‘6

story:

the intent t0

But

general

commit a crime, but

is

intent,

this

that

overlooks or ignores the
€66

the intent required

not speciﬁc intent; in other words,

merely the intent
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t0

it

by

refers not t0

knowingly perform’ the prohibited

act.” State V.

m,

Goggin, 157 Idaho

1, 7,

333 P.3d 112, 118 (2014) (emphasis added);

124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993).

“does not expressly require any mental element,”

it

Thus, because Section 36-1404(3)(c)

only requires “the knowledge that one

possession of the substance”—in this case, the moose.

1

ﬂ alﬂ m

m

@ggLn, 157 Idaho

at 7,

is

in

333 P.3d

at

18.

The indictments conferred
Violations.

Huckabay

fails t0

subject matter jurisdiction and there

show

were n0 due process

otherwise.

III.

Huckabav Fails T0 Show Purported Grand Jury Defects Are Even Reviewable Following His
Fair Trial On The Merits; Alternatively, He Fails To Show The District Court Abused Its
Discretion In Denying His Motion T0 Dismiss For Purported Prosecutorial Misconduct During
The Grand Jury Proceeding
A.

Introduction

Huckabay
indictment.”

incorrectly claims that “prosecutorial misconduct invalidated the grand jury

(Appellant’s brief, p.32 (emphasis altered).)

improperly expressed his opinion

at the

He

alleges that the prosecutor

grand jury proceeding; that the Fish

& Game

Ofﬁcer

“provided erroneous testimony” t0 the grand jury; and that the prosecutor erroneously instructed
the grand jury.

(Id.,

This claim

pp.32-37 (emphasis a1tered).)

fails as

a threshold matter because

it

fails to address,

much

less argue against,

the general rule: “[a]lleged defects in the grand jury process generally will not be reviewed

appeal at

all after

a defendant has been convicted in a fair

151 Idaho 872, 875, 264 P.3d 979, 982 (Ct. App. 2011).

considered,

Huckabay

fails to

show

trial

0n the merits.”

on

State V. Marsalis,

Alternatively, even if the merits are

the district court denied his motions t0 dismiss for purported

prosecutorial misconduct that took place during the grand jury proceeding.
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Standard

B.

Of Review

The decision

t0 grant 0r

deny a motion

to dismiss

an indictment

is left

discretion of the trial court. State V. Buianda—Velazquez, 129 Idaho 726, 728,

(1997).

When

trial court's

a

discretionary decision

is

Within the sound

932 P.2d 354, 356

reviewed on appeal, the appellate court

conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) Whether the lower court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such

discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices before

and

(3)

Whether the lower court reached

its

decision

by an exercise 0f reason.

it;

State V. Hedger,

115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).

Purported Grand Jury Defects Are Reviewable Following

C.

The

A Fair Trial On The Merits

rule in Idaho is that “alleged defects in the grand jury process generally Will not

reviewed 0n appeal

at all after

a defendant has been convicted in a fair

264 P.3d

trial

on the merits.”

982; State V. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517, 164 P.3d 790,

MLsalis, 151 Idaho

at 875,

797 (2007); State

Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 716—17, 23 P.3d 786, 790—91 (Ct. App. 2001);

V.

V.

at

be

Nelson, 131 Idaho 210, 215, 953 P.2d 650, 655 (Ct. App. 1998); State

751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997). This

makes

V. Kilby,

m

130 Idaho 747,

perfect sense: “because a jury subsequently

convicted the defendant, any error connected With the grand jury proceeding was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.”

my,

Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986));

ﬂ alﬂ

by petit jury render any procedural
The
rule.

state

130 Idaho

at

751, 947 P.2d at 424 (quoting United States V.

Mechanik, 475 U.S.

at

67-72

(fair trial

and conviction

error in grand jury proceeding harmless).

has argued in prior cases that there

Marsalis, 151 Idaho at 875, 264 P.3d at 982.
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is

no exception

The

to this longstanding general

state reiterates that

n0 exception

exists,

and urges

this

Court not t0 adopt one. Applying the general rule here instead

Huckabay received a

on the merits; any grand jury

fair trial

beyond a reasonable doubt;

error

thus, the purported defects in the

is

straightforward:

would have been harmless

grand jury proceeding are not

reviewable on appeal. Li.

Huckabay has nothing
around

it,

t0 say about the general rule.

never once acknowledging the hurdle he

Appellant’s brief, pp.32-40.)

Huckabay argues

His citations t0 Marsalis tiptoe

(E

sidestepping along the way.

is

as if the exception t0 the general rule

is

settled

law, without informing anyone that Marsalis never held that; rather, Marsalis simply “assum[ed]

that the issue is properly presented” to

discretion (he could not).

From Huckabay’s

15 1 Idaho at 875, 264 P.3d at 982.

fanciful retelling of Marsalis

general rule that bars his claim.

But there

(m Appellant’s brief, pp.32-40.)
it is

is,

one would never know

and Huckabay has completely

much

and be done With

it.

trial

on the merits,

Huckabay received a

should not be reviewed on appeal

this

fair trial

&

grand jury errors are not

Court should simply apply the general rule

0n the merits and the alleged grand jury

errors

at all.

Huckabav Fails T0 Show The District Court Erred
T0 Dismiss Based On Prosecutorial Misconduct

Alternatively,

Alternatively, if this Court

it.

Because Huckabay does not even

less contest, the general rule that purported

reviewable following a jury

failed t0 address

Patterson V. State, Dep’t of Health

151 Idaho 310, 321, 256 P.3d 718, 729 (2011).

bother to mention,

that there is a

Appellants must set forth arguments in their opening brieﬁng;

too late to raise claims for the ﬁrst time in a reply.

m,

D.

examine Whether Marsalis could even show an abuse of

were

State V. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,

t0 analyze

In

Denying His Motion

Huckabay’s grand jury proceeding pursuant

t0

872 P.2d 708 (1994), notwithstanding the general harmless
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error rule, the inquiry is two-fold.

legally

evidence to

sufﬁcient

First, the

support

Court determines Whether the grand jury received

ﬁnding of probable cause independent of any

a

inadmissible evidence. Li. at 448, 872 P.2d at 71

on

indictment based

legally

sufﬁcient

1.

Second, there

a prejudice requirement:

is

evidence must be dismissed only

prosecutorial misconduct involved in the submission 0f illegal evidence

be prejudicial.

Li.

“Prejudicial effect”

if

alleged

was so egregious

means “the defendant would not have been

for the misconduct.” Li. (citation omitted).

the

An

as to

indicted but

Absent a showing of prejudice by the defendant, the

court “will not second guess the jury.” 125 Idaho at 448, 872 P.2d at 71 1-712.

The

district court

the grand jury.

denied Huckabay’s motion t0 dismiss based on purported misconduct

at

(TL, pp.702-03.) Huckabay claims this was an error, and that three categories 0f

purported misconduct “invalidated” the grand jury proceedings: the prosecutor “twice expressed
his personal opinions about the sufﬁciency

of evidence”; the Fish

& Game

ofﬁcer “provided

erroneous testimony” t0 the grand jury; and the “the prosecutor erroneously instructed the grand
jury.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.32-37.)

1.

Expressions

These arguments will be addressed in

turn.

Of Personal Opinion

Huckabay claims

that the prosecutor

gave two improper personal opinions to the grand

jury:

Immediately

ﬁnal witness had testiﬁed, the prosecutor stated to the grand

after the

jurors: “A11 right. That’s the State’s evidence.

and dry case.” Then

better term, a cut

opinion: “[S]0 Ithink that the evidence

occurred, and so

I

just

wanted

later the
is,

I

think

it’s

a fairly, for lack 0f a

prosecutor repeated his personal

frankly,

overwhelming

that this offense

t0 point that out.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.32 (internal citations omitted).)

A prosecutor may “express
When such an

opinion

is

an opinion in argument as t0 the truth or

based upon the evidence.” State

31

V.

falsity

of testimony

Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 288,

178 P.3d 644, 653 (Ct. App. 2007);

(Ct.

ﬂ

909 P.2d 624, 632

also State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14,

App. 1996) (While a prosecutor may not “express a personal belief 0r opinion as

0r falsity of any testimony or evidence,” a prosecutor

perspective, the evidence

prosecutor

may also

conﬁrms 0r

calls into

may

to the truth

“express how, from [the prosecutor’s]

doubt the credibility 0f particular witnesses”).

argue “that the state’s evidence and theory 0f the case

482

State V. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20, 189 P.3d 477,

(Ct.

App. 2008).

and argument d0 not constitute vouching unless the prosecutor

A

more convincing.”

[is]

A prosecutor’s

opinions

interjects “personal belief”

regarding the evidence or a witness’s credibility, Timmons, 145 Idaho at 289, 178 P.3d at 654, or
asks jurors “t0

rectitude

and

make

their decision

based upon

the prosecutor’s self—proclaimed moral

integrity rather than addressing the evidence,”

m,

146 Idaho

at 20,

189 P.3d

at

482.

In reviewing a claim 0f improper argument

infer that a prosecutor intends

an ambiguous remark t0 have

draw

jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will

damaging

interpretations.’”

by a prosecutor

that

its

“‘a court should not lightly

most damaging meaning 0r

that a

meaning from the plethora of

less

Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 (quoting Donnelly V.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974)).

Huckabay

fails to

show

that either

As

misconduct that led to prejudice.
fairly, for

of the prosecutor’s comments were

for the ﬁrst

comment, the prosecutor

lack 0f a better term, a cut and dry case.”

necessarily a

comment 0n

the evidence,

much

less

was not complex.

There

telling a jury that a straightforward

is

it

less

This was not

“Cut and dry”

just as likely could

much

said, “I think it’s a

Tr., p.74, Ls.22-24.)

an improper one.

been a comment 0n the weight of the evidence, but
that the case

(GJ

error,

may have

have been a comment

nothing inherently objectionable about a prosecutor

case—which

this
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one is—is “cut and dry.” Moreover, the

“I

think”

quip—while maybe not

the best choice of words—should not be inferred “to have

damaging meaning.” Severson, 147 Idaho

Even

may

at

is

the second statement, While plainly closer to the line,

exactly what “overwhelming” meant here.

“I think” language,

was not

In

(E GJ

error.

[is]

any event, even

A prosecutor

more convincing,”

Tr., p.75, Ls.5-10.)

While perhaps inadvisable, should not be inferred “t0 have

meaning.” Severson, 147 Idaho

most

719, 215 P.3d at 439.

properly express “that the state’s evidence and theory 0f the case

which

its

its

Here again, the

most damaging

719, 215 P.3d at 439.

at

if these

statements were erroneous, both statements were harmless.

There was abundant evidence that Huckabay unlawfully possessed the moose, as a review 0f the
grand jury transcript reﬂects. (GJ

Because there

Tr., pp.7-78.)

prosecutor’s two statements, the grand jury

is

no indication

that,

but for the

would not have issued an indictment, any

error

was

harmless.

2.

Fish

& Game Ofﬁcer’s Mistaken Testimony

Huckabay claims

the Fish

A Fish and Game

& Game ofﬁcer gave erroneous testimony at the grand jury:

ofﬁcer acknowledged

at trial that

a critical portion of his grand

was not accurate. The
Huckabay admitted he met with other individuals and drove to the moose and it
was shot; Huckabay was present When the moose was shot; and a moose is a
ofﬁcer’s false grand jury testimony was:

jury testimony

trophy animal.
(Appellant’s brief, p.35 (internal citations omitted).)

N0
owned up
Huckabay
the

one disputes the ofﬁcer mistakenly testiﬁed before the grand jury. The ofﬁcer readily
t0 the mistake at the jury trial

said “[a]11 of

moose was,

(citing

GJ

them got

shot the

and explained

in this vehicle

As

grand jury testimony—that

of Mr. Cushman’s, drove up the road t0 Where

moose and loaded it”—was

Tr., p.48, Ls.4-8).)

that his

incorrect.

(Tr.,

p.275, L.19

the audio recording of the interview (Which
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— p.277, L.4

was not played

for

the grand jury) reveals, that

moose was

shot.

(E State’s EX.

But even granting

When

present

whatsoever.

5,

the

moose

or

was

there

When

the

00:45-01:15.)

that ofﬁcer mistakenly testiﬁed as t0

moose was

the

The

Huckabay did not say he shot

shot,

Huckabay

original indictment alleged

did unlawfully possess” the moose.

t0

fails

show

Whether Huckabay said he was
this

mistake caused any harm

Huckabay “did unlawfully

(R., p.21

(emphasis added).)

moose “and/or

kill” the

There was overwhelming

evidence presented t0 the grand jury t0 prove the state’s alternative theory that Huckabay

(E GJ

unlawfully possessed the moose.

Tr., pp.7-78.)

This includes the ofﬁcer’s unmistaken

testimony that Huckabay admitted t0 “load[ing] the moose into a purple truck” (Which the audio
supports).

(m State’s EX.

5,

02:23-02:32.)

In short, even subtracting

Huckabay shot

the moose, there

alternate theory: that

there

was n0

any erroneous evidence going towards the

was ample evidence

t0 support a probable cause

Huckabay wrongfully possessed

long-lasting

harm from

the moose.

And we

the ofﬁcer’s mistaken statement.

deleted the “did unlawfully kill” charging language, and proceeded t0

possession theory. (Compare R., p.21

and Huckabay

fails to

Huckabay

R., p.243.)

Under any View

ﬁnding on the

can be certain that

The
trial

state ultimately

0n

this error

its

unlawﬁll

was harmless

show any prejudice.

additionally argues that, “[i]n addition, this ofﬁcer erroneously testiﬁed before

the grand jury that

literally

ﬂ

state’s theory that

moose

are a trophy animal.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.35.)

This mistake has

nothing to d0 with this case. The state did not need t0 allege that Huckabay possessed a

trophy animal t0 prove a Section 36-1401(c)(3) Violation, nor did the indictment allege Huckabay

possessed a trophy animal. (R., pp.21-22.)

And beyond Huckabay’s rampant

what the jurors might have speculated about—“[t]he testimony
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left

speculation about

the grand jury with the

impression Huckabay

made

critical

especially desirable and there

it”—he makes n0 serious
had anything

3.

to

admissions and created the false impression the moose was

would be a strong motive

show

effort t0

do with anything.

this

to break the

law

t0 shoot

and possess

mistaken statement, of a non-element of the crime,

(m Appellant’s brief, pp.35-36.)

The Purportedlv Erroneous Jury Instruction

Huckabay claims

that the prosecutor

prosecutor, he conspiratorially claims,

gave the grand jury erroneous instructions.

made an

“effort to hide the elements

The

0f the offense” by not

using “a proper jury instruction With the correct language from” Section 36-1401

(c)(3).

(Appellant’s brief, pp.36-37.)

Variations on this incorrect theme appear throughout Huckabay’s brief.

addressed here.

needed

t0

Huckabay appears

to

They

be saying that the verbatim text of Section 36-1401(c)(3)

be included in the indictments, the grand jury instructions, and the jury instructions.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.19, 36, 41.)

He

contends that “the elements in the statute” must “be

T0

shore up

State V. Hughes, 161 Idaho 826,

392 P.3d

speciﬁcally stated” to properly allege “the essential facts” of Section 36-1401(c)(3).

his point,

4

(Ct.

are best

Huckabay

seizes

on the following quote from

App. 2014):
In order to state the essential facts of an LC. § 36—1401(c)(3) Violation, the

prosecutor must allege that the defendant unlawfully killed, possessed, or wasted

any combination 0f numbers or species of wildlife within a twelve-month period
With a single or combined reimbursable damage assessment of more than $1,000.
(1d,,

p.19 (citing

m,

Huckabay

was required

is

m

161 Idaho at 832, 392 P.3d at 10).)

again misreading

t0 incant the

m.

The

Court was not saying that the

magic words “combination of numbers or species”

state

in order t0

successfully allege a Section 36-1401(c)(3) Violation, 0r instruct a grand or petit jury of the same.
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m m,

The

161 Idaho at 832, 392 P.3d at 10.

mm

Court was simply setting out the

elements of the crime—which the state satisﬁes by “set[ting] forth the act or omission charged as

an offense.” LC.

§ 19-1410.

We know this because the

state’s

m
m
m

0f numbers or species” language.

state did

test.

m,

161

m

Idaho

never included the “combination

at

832,

392 P.3d

at

Court did not hold the information was deﬁcient because

unsurprisingly, the

hocus-pocus

information in

Q

The

Moreover, as the

state

pointed out

unmistakably concluded that one animal—a single “buck mule deer’

1401(c)(3).

Li. at 833,

392 P.3d

at 11

it

And,

failed the

Court never concluded the information failed because the

not ritualistically invoke the phrase, “combination 0f numbers or species.”

832-33, 392 P.3d at 10-11.

10.

9

earlier, the

would

EQ

at

Hughes Court

satisfy Section 36-

(emphasis added). In any event, Huckabay

fails to

show

the indictment, the grand jury instructions, or the jury instructions faltered for not including

verbatim quotes from Section 36-1401(c)(3).

Huckabay

closes this section with an miffed parting shot, complaining that “[t]he State

has been permitted to manipulate the court system.” (Appellant’s brief, p.40.) This accusation

self—refuting,

as

Huckabay’s laundry

assuming Huckabay shows any error
“manipulation” of anything.

list

at all,

he

fails to

(ﬂ Appellant’s brief,

even one measly error that affected the
harmless the

of purported “manipulations” demonstrates.

district court correctly

trial.

(E

show

p.40.)

id.)

that

any error reﬂects a

Moreover, he

Even
state

unable to muster

Because every purported error was

denied Huckabay’s motions t0 dismiss.
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is

is

IV.

Huckabav Fails T0 Show The
A.

When It Instructed The

District Court Erred

Jury

Introduction

Huckabay

incorrectly claims that the jury instructions

that “[t]he district court, over defense objection,

that resulted in misstating the applicable

pp.41-42.)

Huckabay

In particular,

law

were

“fatally deficient”;

he argues

committed error involving multiple instructions

t0 the jury

and prejudicing” him. (Appellant’s

brief,

takes issue with the district court’s refusal to give his

proposed instruction D10, “regarding the requirement of a combination of numbers and species,”

and his proposed instruction D16, “requir[ing] the jury

t0

ﬁnd

that a taking 0r killing

had

occurred to satisfy the unlawfully possessed element.” (Appellant’s brief, p.42.) With respect to
both7 instructions, Huckabay

Standard

B.

fails to

show

error.

Of Review

Whether a jury was properly
exercises free review.

instructed

is

a question 0f law over Which this Court

“An

Severson, 147 Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430.

instructions only constitutes reversible error

When

error in jury

the instruction misled the jury or prejudiced

the party challenging the instruction.” Li. (citation omitted). “If the instructions, ‘considered as a

7

Huckabay perhaps makes another

district

court

refused

instruction

“[r]espectfully, [the text in
n.9.)

D9]

is

claim, buried in a polite aside in a footnote.

D9 by

concluding

it

was

“[n]0t

the

He notes
law,”

that the

but

that,

exactly what the legislature enacted.” (Appellant’s brief, p.42,

Respectful disagreement alone does not clearly state Whether Huckabay thinks this was an

Because Huckabay does not forthrightly claim the district court erred with respect t0 D9,
and because appellants are required to plainly articulate and support issues on appeal, this
error.

alluded-to, hinted-at error
V.

is

altogether insufﬁcient to present a claim for appellate review.

Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)

(“When

issues

0n appeal

m

are not

supported by propositions of law, authority, 0r argument, they will not be considered”).
Alternatively, to the extent Huckabay has not waived a challenge to instruction D9 on appeal,
that claim fails for all the reasons articulated in this brieﬁng.
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Whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law, then no error [has
been] committed.”’ Li. (citations omitted).

The

C.

District

Court Did Not Err In Reiecting Huckabav’s Proposed Jury Instructions,

Which Contained Erroneous Statements Of The Law, Were Adequatelv Covered BV
Other Instructions, Or Were Otherwise Not Supported BV The Facts Of The Case

A

trial

must

court presiding over a criminal case

instruct the jury

0n

all

matters 0f law

necessary for the jury’s information.” Severson, 147 Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430 (citing I.C. §
19-2132).)

“This necessarily includes instructions on the ‘nature and elements of the crime

charged and the essential legal principles applicable t0 the evidence that has been admitted.” Li
(citing State V. Gain,

When requested,

140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922

instructions

App. 2004)).

(Ct.

It

also includes,

0n “every defense or theory of the defense having any support

evidence.” State V. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 633, 38 P.3d 1285, 1289 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing

V.

Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 328, 986 P.2d 346, 351

entitled to request the delivery

(Ct.

of speciﬁc instructions,

99

in the

m

App. 1999)). Although “[e]ach party
66

such instructions Will be given [only]

is

if

they are ‘correct and pertinent.” Severson, 147 Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430 (citing I.C. § 192132).)

“A proposed

0f the law;

instruction

(2) adequately

is

not ‘correct and pertinent’ if

it is

(1)

an erroneous statement

covered by other instructions; or (3) ‘not supported by the facts 0f the

case.” Severson, 147 Idaho

at

710-1

1,

215 P.3d

at

430-31 (citing State

V.

Olsen, 103 Idaho 278,

285, 647 P.2d 734, 741 (1982)).

Huckabay

alleges that the district court erred

D10 and D16. These

claims Will be taken up in turn.
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by denying

his

proposed jury instructions

1.

Instruction

D10

Huckabay’s proposed instruction D10 sought
§ 36-1401(c)(3) regarding the

to include “the

verbatim language from

requirement 0f a combination 0f numbers and species.”

I.C.

His

instruction stated:

A)

In order for the defendant t0 be guilty of unlawful possession of wildlife the

Government must prove

the following:

a.

On 0r about October 2,

b.

in the state

c.

the defendant John

2014,

of Idaho,

Huckabay

intentionally

and unlawfully possessed

any combination 0f numbers or species of Wildlife Within a twelve (12)
month period which has a single or combined reimbursable damage
d.

assessment 0f more than one thousand dollars ($1,000),
in a closed season, and

e.

without a

The

(R., p.547.)

tag.

district court rejected this instruction,

concluding

Information” and “inconsistent with the elements instruction.”
the district court accepted the state’s proposed instruction 8,

In order for the Defendant to be guilty of

the state

it

was

“inconsistent with the

(TL, p.445, Ls.18-20.)

which

Instead,

stated:

Unlawﬁll Possession of a Wild Animal

must prove each of the following:

1.

On or about the 2nd day 0f October,

2.

in the state

3.

the Defendant, John [Alison] Huckabay, did unlawfully possess a wild

2014;

of Idaho;

animal with a single damage assessment of more than one thousand dollars
($1,000.00);
4.

(R., p.481.)

in a closed season and/or without a tag.

The

district court

likely t0 confuse the trier

and the

state’s instruction

As

explained

at

of

concluded the

fact.”

shows the

no one disputes

(TL, pp.445, Ls.20-22.)
district court

was

A

was “much

clearer”

and

“less

comparison 0f the statutory text

correct.

length herein, the single alleged “Wild animal” satisﬁed the “any

combination 0f numbers” element.
out, as

state’s instruction

this case

(E R., p.481.)

The “species” language was properly

involved one species.
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(E Q)

left

Similarly, the “twelve (12)

month” language was properly omitted.

mont

as such, the “twelve (12)

instruction

and was not

properly omitted.

”

at issue.

(m Q)

It is

undisputed that this incident took place 0n one day;

language necessarily overlapped with the “2nd day 0f October”

(ﬂ Q)

“combined” assessment language was

Lastly, the

Huckabay has never claimed

that this case presents a

“combined”

value question, nor could he have non-surrealistically argued the jury should have been instructed

about the combined value of a single moose.

The
facts

state’s instruction

of the charged crime.

statutory language that

This

p.481.)

P.3d

at

is

was

accordingly covered

(Compare

R., p.481

all

0f the statutory elements that applied to the

ﬂ

LC.

irrelevant to the facts or covered

exactly What proper jury instructions d0.

430-3 1. As such, the

§ 36-1401(c)(3).)

by other

did not use

It

instructions.

(E

R.,

Severson, 147 Idaho at 710-11, 215

district court correctly rej ected

Huckabay’s instruction and accepted

the state’s instruction instead. Li. at 710, 215 P.3d at 430.

Huckabay

cites t0

mm

and argues

that the verbatim text

of the

statute,

including the

phrase “any combination of numbers 0r species,” should have been included in the jury
instruction.

what

(Appellant’s brief, p.42.)

mm

As

already explained herein, in section III.D.3, that

is

not

requires.

Huckabay

additionally argues that, because the state “consistently argued” the statute

was

unambiguous, “the use of the statutory language in a jury instruction could not be more
appropriate.”

and

still

(Appellant’s brief, p.42.)

This misses the point.

A

contain already covered language—such as the “twelve (12)

a statute can be unambiguous and
as “0r species”

still

contain language that

and “combined reimbursable damage.”

is

statute

can be unambiguous

month period”

clause.

And

not applicable to the facts—such

Neither

mm, nor any

other Idaho

authority, supports the notion that the district court should intentionally instruct the jury with
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unambiguous
otherwise

statutory language that

sow

is

already covered, inapplicable t0 the facts, 0r that

would

confusion.

This point

is

Assume

readily demonstrated.

the

state

charged some hypothetical

mustache-twirling defendant With a Title 18-6010 Violation (obstruction or interference With

railroad), for maliciously placing

right-minded

would approve

district court

a.

On or about January

b.

in the State

c.

The

1,

On

an obstruction 0n a railroad track.

those spare facts, no

the following instruction:

2000,

of Idaho,

defendant

Whiplash willfully 0r maliciously placed

Snidely

any

obstruction 0n any railroad track 0r roadbed, 0r street car track in this state, or

loosened, tore up,

0r

rail,

switch, frog, guard

any part 0f such railroad track 0r roadbed 0r

cattle guard, or

Who tampered

removed or misplaced any

rail,

street car track, or

With 0r molested any such road, roadbed 0r track, or destroyed

damaged any locomotive, motor or

car

0n said

track, 0r

Who

otherwise

interfered with the maintenance or operation of such road so as t0 endanger

the safety of any train, car,

motor or engine, or so as

t0

endanger or injure any

passenger 0r person riding thereon, 0r being about the same.

Minus some
Huckabay would

archaic “sha11”s, this

insist

upon.

LC.

is

a verbatim quote 0f an unambiguous statute, just as

But under the assumed

§ 18-6010.

ﬁlled With irrelevant language, and disjunctive “or”s, and

district courts are

instructions, as

not required to simply

pump

is

confusing.

facts this instruction is

This

is

precisely

why

carbon copies of statutory text into the jury

Huckabay wrongly concludes. Severson, 147 Idaho

at

710-1

even assuming arguendo there was any instructional

error,

1,

215 P.3d

at

430-

31.

Finally,

show

reversible error.

Severson, 147 Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430.

instructions misled the jury,

beyond claiming

how he was

and does not allege

He

is

impermissible.”

41

fails t0

does not show the

prejudiced by state’s instruction

that “[a] jury instruction that lightens the prosecutor’s

omitting an element of the crime

Huckabay

8,

burden 0f proof by

But, as explained above, the state’s jury

instruction covered every element of the crime as charged. Accordingly,

Huckabay

fails to

show

anyone tinkered with the burden 0f proof, or any other prejudice.

The
and

district court correctly

concluded that “State’s [instruction] 8” was “much clearer”

“less likely to confuse the trier

own proposed

was

fails to

“correct and pertinent,” or otherwise “supported

Severson, 147 Idaho at 710-1

this case.”

much

instruction

of fact.” (TL, p.445, Ls.20-22.) Huckabay

1,

215 P.3d

at

430-31.

As

show

by the

such, he fails t0

facts

show

his

of

error,

less reversible error.

2.

InstructionD16

Huckabay
instruction

additionally

D16, which

claims

the

district

court

should have

given his proposed

stated:

Unlawful possession is deﬁned by statute in Idaho Code Section 36-502(b) which
states “no person shall have in his possession any wildlife or parts thereof
protected by the provisions 0f Idaho Code Title 36 and the taking or killing of

Which

is

unlawful.[”]

(R., p.553.)

The

district court rej ected this instruction

possession.”

(TL, p.447, Ls.20-21.)

because

The possession

it

was “covered by

instruction,

the instruction as to

Which the

district

ultimately gave, stated that “[a] person has possession of something if the person

presence and has physical control 0f

it,

or has the

power and

“[m]ore than one person can be in possession of something
the

power and

intention to control

it.”

(R., p.491.)

if

intention t0 control

knows of
it,”

and

its

that

each knows 0f its presence and has

Additionally, the district court rejected

Huckabay’s proposed D16 because “there doesn’t have to be proof of a taking or

killing in this

case by the defendant,” and “[i]t’s likely to confuse the jury.” (TL, p.447, Ls.21-24.)
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court

The

“[T]he pattern Idaho Criminal Jury

district court correctly instructed the jury.

Instructions are presumptively correct statements of law,

unless another instruction

State V. Reid,

would more adequately,

and

trial

courts are expected to use

them

accurately, 0r clearly state the applicable law.”

151 Idaho 80, 85, 253 P.3d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 201

The

1).

district court’s

possession instruction was taken from the “Possession Defined” pattern instruction, which

correctly sets forth the well-settled

360, 900 P.2d

1367,

1371

law of possession. ICJI 421; State

The

(1995).

possession was already covered, and that

Huckabay wraps up by rebooting some
have been instructed “t0 ﬁnd

that a taking or killing

jury should have been instructed to
scienter that he

confusing and incorrectly stated the law.

He

familiar refrains.

instructions to allege he “unlawfully possessed a

had occurred”;

killed during a closed season, without a tag, or

alleges that the jury should

that

moose by possessing

ﬁnd “proof that he possessed

knew, 0r was grossly negligent

127 Idaho 356,

court therefore correctly concluded that

district

D16 was

V. Seitter,

in not

the

it

was

“circular” for the

the animal”; and that the

moose With an element of

knowing, that the moose had been taken 0r

by an unauthorized method.” (Appellant’s

brief,

pp.42-43.)

As

explained more fully in section II.D.1 above,

all

0f these arguments

not required to prove “taking or killing” to prove possession, nor was

it

fail.

The

state

was

“circular” t0 allege

unlawful possession With a possession element, nor was the state required to prove a speciﬁc

mental

state.

reversible error.

Moreover, even assuming some instructional
Severson, 147 Idaho at 710-1

correctly reﬁlsed instruction

D16 and

1,

215 P.3d

at

error,

430-31.

correctly instructed the jury.
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Huckabay

As

fails

t0

show

such, the district court

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

Court afﬁrm the judgment of conviction.

19th day of July, 2019.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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